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In his essay regarding Civil Disobedience, the philosopher Henry David Thoreau 
states: “Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man 
is prison.”  Although this line is from a work that is well over 150 years old, these words 
may invoke a moral outrage to some when looking at this country’s tremendous growth 
in imprisonment over the past 35 years.  Thoreau wrote the above quote motivated by his 
devout disagreement with giving obedience to a government that enforces legal slavery 
(Thoreau, 2009).  Legal scholar Michelle Alexander, who has written a book on 
incarceration in the US, was quoted in an interview with NPR saying that “today there are 
more African-Americans under correctional control—in prison or jail, on probation or 
parole—then were enslaved in 1850 (Alexander, 2012).   
The great social injustice of slavery that inspired dissent from some such as 
Thoreau has been replaced by a proliferation of imprisonment and correctional control as 
this country’s present-day method of legally-enforcing the minority subjugation found 
throughout our nation’s history.  It may initially seem like hyperbole to compare this 
country’s past legal enforcement of African-American slavery with our nation’s current 
system of mass incarceration but there are a number of crime and imprisonment statistics 
that justify making the comparison.   
Many in society may try to make the argument that high and increasing 
imprisonment in this country is simply a result of a tremendous increase in crime.  
However, according to every barometer used by our government to measure violent 
crime, there has actually been a decrease in serious violent crime (Konradi & Schmidt, 
2004).  In spite of this decrease in violent crime, the prison system of this country has 
grown significantly since the 1980s.  This growth can be significantly attributed to 
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enforcement of tougher drug laws.  In 1980 there were roughly 19,000 prisoners in state 
penitentiaries convicted of drug offenses, amounting to about 6 percent of state prisoners.  
By 2007 this number grew to 253,300 or about 19.5 percent of all inmates in state 
prisons.  The 2007 data show that the percentage of drug offenders in federal prisons is 
even higher as 53.5 percent of all federal inmates are convicted drug criminals (Clear, 
Cole, & Reisig, 2011).   
The Bureau of Justice Statistics first began reporting on the number of people 
under correctional supervision (including those on parole, probation, and incarcerated in 
prison or jail) in 1980 and found that there were fewer than two million adults that fit this 
classification.  In  2009 the total membership in this group had exploded to over seven 
million adults under some form of correctional supervision according to the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics (Glaze, 2010).  This explosion in correctional supervision has primarily 
been due to increasing enforcement of drug abuse violations and is narrowly concentrated 
among minorities in our society, particularly African-American and Hispanic men.  For 
example, a 2001 comparison of imprisonment rates found that there were 3,535 sentenced 
black males in prisons and jails per 100,000 black men in the population compared with 
only 462 sentenced white men per 100,000 white men in the population (Konradi & 
Schmidt, 2004).  
 As shocking as these statistics are, they are just the tip of the iceberg in 
unraveling the true nature of this country’s tremendous imprisonment expansion since the 
1980s, which is primarily the result of increasing criminal penalties for drug violations.  
This essay will show that the War on Drug policy that was enacted in the 1980s during 
the Reagan administration has been the driving force responsible for turning this nation’s 
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criminal justice system into the latest institution responsible for perpetuating minority 
subjugation in our society.  This policy amounts to no less than a war waged on the poor 
minority communities that are disproportionately targeted for the enforcement of drug 
law violations.  Like the institution of slavery and the practice of legally enforced 
segregation during the Jim Crow era, drug laws and their enforcement function to 
perpetuate a minority underclass for exploitation by the elite of society.  Court decisions 
and policies regarding this nation’s decades-long crackdown on drug violations have 
turned our criminal justice system into a modern institution of social control on exploited 
minority communities.  
 The racial inequity evidenced in the unequal enforcement of harsh criminal 
penalties for drug violations in minority communities today should come as no surprise to 
anyone familiar with the history of drug laws in our society.  A brief look at past drug 
legislation on a number of different substances at different times throughout our nation’s 
history shows that drug laws have routinely been heavily influenced by both racial and 
class motivations.  For example, Chinese immigrants that remained in the country after 
completing work on the railroads in the 1870s were associated with opium-smoking.  
Anglo-Americans at this time were widespread users of opium as well; however they 
consumed opium through oral administration.  Opium-smoking soon became the target of 
a strong anti-drug effort after the railroads were finished while the oral use of opium was 
not really considered a problem (Beckett, Nyrop, Pfingst & Bowen, 2005).   
However, opium is not the only drug in which racial sentiments had an effect on 
perceived social harm.  Jimmie L. Reeves and Richard Campbell showed in 1994 how 
media representations of cocaine stories shifted from an emphasis on the possibility of 
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recovery in the early 1980s, when the focus was on white recreational users who snorted 
powder cocaine, to a law and order response to the drug problem by late 1985 when 
cocaine users were depicted as poor, nonwhite crack cocaine smokers (Beckett, Nyrop, 
Pfingst & Bowen, 2005).  
 Of course it would not be fair to leave out our country’s experiment with 
Prohibition in the early 1900s when discussing historic examples of the use of controlled 
substance policy to target particular groups in society.  Prohibition is seen by William J. 
Stuntz as “partly a revolt against cities by the countryside, against immigrants by the 
native-born, and against Catholics by Protestants—just as the system’s crusade against 
crack has been partly a revolt against poor urban blacks by middle-class suburban whites 
(Stuntz, 1998).”   
These three examples all at different times in our country’s history, show that it is 
very common for society to target a particular racial or social group in the creation and 
enforcement of stringent drug laws.  The tremendous overrepresentation of black males 
among the incarcerated population of our country today due to the war on drugs may thus 
be perceived more skeptically by those who seek an explanation for this injustice.  Given 
the past history of drug law enforcement, it is much harder to believe that the egregious 
overrepresentation of black males incarcerated in this country due to war on drugs policy 
is anything but a calculated suppression of a socially-stigmatized racial group.   
 Now that the historic prevalence of racially-motivated drug control policies has 
been examined, it is time to take a closer look at the increase in enforcing strict criminal 
penalties for drug possession and distribution violations beginning in the mid-1980s here 
referred to as “war on drugs policy.”  This is not simply a reference to one particular 
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piece of drug control legislation but instead refers to the political and societal support for 
increasingly harsh penalties of imprisonment for drug law violators beginning with 
President Reagan and still evident today.  
In 1982, the same year that Reagan first announced his administration’s war on 
drugs, less than 2 percent of the public thought illegal drugs were the most important 
issue facing the country (Alexander, 2010 p. 49).  However, Reagan steadily increased 
the resources dedicated to drug law enforcement while greatly decreasing the money 
allocated to drug education and treatment.  Later in his term, The Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1986 was signed into law by Reagan, a law which included mandatory minimum 
sentences of imprisonment for cocaine distribution (Alexander, 2010).  Under this law the 
distribution of cocaine in the form of crack, which was primarily associated with blacks, 
was treated much more severely than distribution of powder cocaine which is associated 
with whites.  This law established a five year mandatory-minimum prison sentence for 
the distribution of five grams of crack cocaine.  An individual found guilty of distribution 
of the very same drug in powder form would have to be in possession of 500 grams of 
cocaine in order to receive the same five year mandatory-minimum sentence (Vagins & 
McCurdy, 2006).  Two years later Congress, with the help of President Reagan, put 
further clamps down on those found guilty of drug offenses by passing the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988.  This law included civil penalties such as permitting public housing 
authorities to evict any tenant that lets any kind of drug-related criminal activity transpire 
on or near public housing premises. This legislation also featured the additional civil 
penalty of removing eligibility of many federal benefits such as student loans for those 
convicted of a drug offense.  The law also increased criminal penalties by establishing 
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new mandatory minimum sentences of incarceration for drug offenses.  Examples of 
increased criminal penalties included expanding the use of the death penalty in severe 
drug-related crimes as well as establishing a mandatory five year sentence for the mere 
possession of cocaine base (Alexander, 2010 p. 52-53).  
It appears that these increasingly stiff penalties for nonviolent drug offenses that 
began in the 1980s signaled a shift to further suppress those who use or sell illegal drugs 
and in essence block them from any legitimate avenue of success in mainstream society.  
Not only did a conviction for the simple possession of a painfully addictive drug like 
crack result in a mandatory period of incarceration, but now those convicted of drug 
crimes could be further punished upon reintegrating into society after serving time by 
banning them from receiving some forms of public aid.  Although the initial pitch of 
fighting to eradicate the use of harmful and addictive drugs may seem like a 
commendable policy goal to the casual observer, the policies that have been enacted, as 
well as the strategy guiding this country’s fight against drugs in recent years, have 
functioned to destroy the minority communities that were the real target of this drug war 
policy.   
 Prior to the 1980s and for almost fifty years, the United States had a consistent 
prison population of about 200,000 individuals.  Today this country leads the world in 
incarceration with 2.3 million people confined in the nation’s federal and state prisons 
and local jails (Gotsch, 2011).  The tenfold increase in the incarcerated population of the 
country over the past three decades is very alarming for those concerned that the criminal 
justice system may be used to exert social control on the weak in society.  The egregious 
overrepresentation of minority individuals in this country’s bloated prison population is 
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enough to raise even more doubt that the war on drugs has been used to suppress minority 
communities.   
One common explanation espoused by the ill-informed for the overrepresentation 
of minority males in prison for drug law violations is that there is a higher propensity for 
minorities to use drugs.  However, a look at the data does not lend support for this belief 
as there are only small differences in the illegal drug use prevalence of different racial 
lines (Drucker, 1999).  The most recent (2010) National Survey on Drug Use and Health 
reported that the rate of current drug use amongst blacks was 10.7 percent while the rate 
among whites was 9.1 percent.  The rate among Hispanics was even lower at 8.1 percent.  
The survey concluded that there was no statistically significant differences in the rate of 
past month drug use for any of the racial groups included in the results (Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration, 2011).  
Since drugs are used at about the same prevalence across racial categories it 
would be logical to assume that an increase in criminal penalties for drug violations 
would impact all races at about the same rate.  This is sadly very far from the reality.  
Although the evidence tells us that all races use drugs at comparable levels, the 
enforcement and implementation of drug war policy primarily occurs in poor, minority 
communities.  This fact is evidenced by the prison statistics as African American men are 
13.4 times more likely than whites to be imprisoned for drug crimes (Clear, Cole, & 
Reisig, 2011 p. 529).  By taking a closer look at the policies and judicial decisions that 
have guided the enforcement of this nation’s war on drugs, it becomes evident that this 
country’s decades-long crackdown on drug violations is intended to target and 
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incarcerate—and ultimately control or even subjugate—minorities and particularly black 
males.  
 The control of minorities through increased criminal penalties for conviction on a 
drug violation was not the only motivator for state and local law enforcement agencies to 
increase their resources dedicated to drug crime.  The Comprehensive Crime Act of 1984 
included a section that outlined a financial motivation for law enforcement agencies: 
asset forfeiture.  This provision created a system allowing any local police agency that 
cooperated with federal drug enforcement authorities in a drug investigation to receive a 
substantial percentage of any assets seized as a result of the investigation.  This provision 
went further by allowing law enforcement agencies to circumvent state laws that require 
seized assets go to areas or agencies other than law enforcement (Benson, Rasmussen & 
Sollars, 1995).   
Obviously, law enforcement agencies now had financial motivation to target their 
resources toward drug enforcement while at the same time diverting resources away from 
other areas, even if those areas may be in greater need but do not offer the same return on 
investment.  This inference is supported by data that show drug arrests relative to arrests 
for reported Index I crimes against persons and property remained relatively stable at one 
to four from 1970 to 1984.  Five years later in 1989, this rate had changed significantly so 
that for every drug arrest the police were making 2.2 arrests for Index I crimes (Benson, 
Rasmussen, & Sollars, 1995).  Between 1988 and 1992 there was over $1 billion in assets 
seized by state drug task forces (Alexander, 2010 p. 78).  Data from the U.S. Marshals 
Service, which manages all assets seized by federal law enforcement agencies throughout 
the nation, list the value of all forfeited assets seized in the year 2012 at $4.4 billion (U.S. 
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Department of Justice, 2012).  A Benson, Rasmussen, and Sollars study in 1995 found 
evidence that police bureaucracies responded to the benefit of asset forfeiture laws for 
drug crimes by making more drug arrests (Benson, Rasmussen, & Sollars, 1995 p. 38).  
The recent data from 2012 seem to indicate that law enforcement agencies today are still 
highly motivated by these forfeiture practices and continue to focus on crimes involving 
seized assets such as drug offenses.   
Moreover and not surprisingly, drug forfeiture laws have also provided a 
tremendous avenue for corruption within law enforcement agencies.  When these 
provisions were first adopted, property or cash could be taken from an individual based 
on the mere suspicion of illegal drug activity.  All that had to be shown was that there 
was probable cause that the property or cash had been involved in a crime.  In some cases 
then, forfeiture laws were exploited to allow wealthy drug dealers an avenue for lowering 
their sentence.  An investigation by journalists in Massachusetts found that on average a 
“payment of $50,000 in drug profits won a 6.3 year reduction in a sentence for dealers 
(Alexander, 2010 p. 78).”  Such “payments” obviously lead to unfair treatment of poor 
drug users and low-level dealers as they do not have the assets required to buy their way 
out of imprisonment.  These laws, as Blumenson and Nielsen (1998) note, are a big 
reason why our nation’s prisons are filled with large numbers of men and women who 
had minor roles in drug distribution, while many of their bosses—the so-called drug 
kingpins—remained free.  This system ensures that the poor who suffer the worst 
consequences of illegal drug use are most likely to receive the penalty of imprisonment 
while those making money exploiting poor drug users can often buy leniency.  By 
including forfeiture laws in this country’s war on drug policy, we created a criminal 
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justice system where law enforcement can both condemn drug use and profit from it at 
the same time.  This is an outrageous conflict of interest, as very few in law enforcement 
would ever want to completely eradicate the drug market, even if this was possible, 
because of the funding that forfeitures generate.  Since 1985, the federal government has 
shared $6.6 billion in forfeiture proceeds with state and local law enforcement agencies 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2012).  The forfeiture process established by the federal 
government also encouraged many state legislatures to incorporate the forfeiture process 
into their standard law enforcement practices (Benson, Rasmussen, & Sollars, 1995).  
Asset forfeiture laws ensured that law enforcement agencies would have a financial 
incentive to focus their efforts on detecting drug crimes because they would receive a cut 
of any assets seized.  These forfeiture laws help to guarantee that poor drug offenders will 
be the most likely offenders subjected to the social control of imprisonment. 
 Besides asset forfeiture, recent judicial decisions regarding certain law 
enforcement tactics employed in the war on drugs have also had a substantial impact on 
where and how drug laws are enforced.  For example, the Supreme Court has made a 
number of rulings over the course of this decades-long war on drugs regarding 
interpretation of Fourth Amendment protections.  The Fourth Amendment, part of the 
Bill of Rights in the US Constitution,  protects people from unreasonable searches and 
seizures by the government as well as establishing the need to issue warrants based on 
probable cause (U.S. Const. amend. IV).  The laws surrounding search and seizure play a 
key role in establishing substantive and procedural limits on some police tactics, but not 
others (Stuntz, 1998).  Importantly to this discussion, decisions made by the Supreme 
Court regarding the constitutionality of law enforcement tactics under the 4
th
 Amendment 
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have routinely favored law enforcement, many times at the expense of poor, minority 
drug offenders.  
One such ruling concerning consent searches was made in the case of Florida v. 
Bostick.  In this case, a twenty-eight year old African-American man who had fallen 
asleep on a Greyhound bus on his way to Atlanta was abruptly awoken by two officers. 
These officers not only asked Bostick for his identification and bus ticket but also sought 
permission to search his bag.  The officers had no reasonable suspicion that Bostick was 
involved in illegal activity and were simply going through the buses looking for people 
who might be carrying drugs.  Bostick allowed the officers to search his bag even though 
he knew there was a pound of cocaine in it which led to him being charged and convicted 
of trafficking cocaine.  On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the conduct of 
the police was in violation of 4
th
 Amendment protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures because the search was conducted without the suspicion that Bostick was 
committing a crime.  The Florida Court went so far as to compare the practice of bus 
sweeps in consent searches for illegal drugs to the unwarranted stops that were common 
under the rule of Hitler in Germany.  The United States Supreme Court, however, 
reversed the decision of the Florida court ruling that Bostick’s encounter with the police 
was voluntary.  According to the majority opinion, Bostick was not considered seized 
under the Fourth Amendment as a reasonable person in his situation would have felt that 
he or she was free to refuse to answer the police officer’s questions and to deny the 
request of the officers to search his bag.  This, according to the Supreme Court, made the 
entire encounter “consensual” thereby establishing the “consent search” as a powerful 
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tool for law enforcement in waging the war on drugs because the Court ensured this 
decision would apply to all future drug sweeps (Alexander, 2010).   
 Since the police no longer need any sort of suspicion to make contact with an 
individual and gain “consent” for a search, they are free to use race to target certain 
people for investigation.  In his dissenting opinion decision on Bostick, Justice Thurgood 
Marshall stated his belief that racial discrimination would likely play a role when an 
officer decides whom to target in order to conduct suspicion-less sweeps for drugs 
(Alexander, 2010).  This fear appears to have been valid as four years after consent 
searches were established African-Americans accounted for 35% of all drug arrests, 55% 
of all drug convictions, and 74% of all drug sentences while accounting for only 13% of 
monthly drug users (Mauer & Huling, 1995).  In 1982, the year Reagan declared his war 
on drugs blacks already accounted for a disproportionate 29 percent of all drug arrests.  
This percentage increased significantly after the drug war was declared peaking at 42 
percent in 1991, the same year as the Bostick decision.  The two years following Bostick 
the arrest rate remained at 40 percent or above (Human Rights Watch, 2009). These data, 
along with the exceedingly high rate of incarceration for African-Americans seen today, 
support the notion that African-Americans are unfairly targeted for enforcement of drug 
violations.   
Perhaps the worst indictment against the Court’s majority decision in Bostick to 
allow consent searches without the basis of prior suspicion of illegal activity is the 
extreme disconnect between the Court’s “reasonable person’s” perception of the 
voluntary nature of a police encounter and how most people actually react in the real-life 
scenario.  Almost every constitutional scholar who has looked into this issue is in 
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disagreement with the Court and state that the average, reasonable person will not feel 
like they are free to leave when approached and questioned by law enforcement (Maclin, 
1991).  In fact, the Supreme Court itself noted in an earlier ruling in Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte (1973) that if the right of an individual to refuse a consent search was really 
“knowing, intelligent, and voluntary,” it would raise serious doubt as to whether these 
consent searches would still be conducted (Alexander, 2010).   
In other words, the Court almost two decades earlier acknowledged that the utility 
to law enforcement of the consent search is contingent on the public being unaware that 
they have the right to refuse cooperation in these encounters with the police.  This 
completely invalidates the “reasonable person” standard upon which the Bostick decision 
was dependent.  By upholding the constitutionality of the consent search, the Supreme 
Court significantly reduced individual protections against police power.  The Court’s 
justification for doing so was espoused in their “reasonable person” explanation but this 
fictitious person created in the court room does not exist.  Individual protections against 
the powers of the state are vital in a democratic society, especially when a person’s 
freedom may be at stake.  Police officers should not be allowed to target people for 
investigation without having some sort of rational suspicion of illegal behavior.  This 
Court decision allowed the nation’s war on drugs to proceed without this basic check on 
law enforcement and ensured that the police would disproportionately target people from 
minority communities.  
 As if legalizing the practice of the consent search was not enough to make sure 
that the war on drugs would be waged extensively in minority communities, the Supreme 
Court provided law enforcement with another powerful tool: the pretext traffic stop.  In 
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the case of Whren v. United States, the majority opinion of the Court ruled in favor of the 
law enforcement practice of using a minor traffic violation as a pretext for police to 
attempt to gain consent for search of individuals subjectively suspected by the officer to 
be in violation of drug laws.  The justices of the Court were unanimous in their 
agreement that “subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth 
Amendment analysis.”  This essentially gave the police the authority to pull over any 
driver for any pretext, as long as the officer observes a minor traffic violation prior to 
initiating contact.  Unsurprisingly, the ruling of the Court in Whren fueled the calculated 
targeting of minorities by law enforcement officials searching for potential drug 
offenders.  For example, the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) started a program 
in 1984 under President Reagan known as Operation Pipeline.  This program, which 
continues today, provides federal training to state and local law enforcement officers on 
how to lengthen a routine traffic stop and how such stops can be leveraged into a search 
for illegal drugs, either by extorting “consent” from the driver or manufacturing probable 
cause (Bascuas, 2007 p. 761).  Of course the DEA says that they do not train police to use 
racial profiling, but numerous civil lawsuits brought against police departments that 
implement Operation Pipeline tactics consistently show that Hispanic and black 
individuals are unfairly targeted for investigation in comparison to white drivers 
(Bascuas, 2007 p. 762).  Perhaps the worst infringement of the pretext traffic stops 
widely employed by law enforcement officers in the war on drugs is the huge number of 
people who must be targeted for search in order for this practice to have any success.  
Law enforcement officers must utilize a “shotgun” approach by pulling over huge 
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numbers of people that are primarily minority and more often than not, innocent of any 
drug-related crime (Bascuas, 2007 p. 763).   
 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Whren is consistent with the dismantling of 4th 
Amendment protections supported by the majority opinion in the Bostick case discussed 
earlier that legalized consent searches in the war on drugs.  Pretext traffic stops have 
facilitated the mass incarceration of minority drug offenders by legalizing and 
proliferating the police practice of conducting invasive drug investigations, often based 
on racial discrimination.  In this country’s current war against drugs police officers are 
not only given the legal authority to initiate a drug investigation without any semblance 
of probable cause (Bostick), they are also free to begin such an investigation based on 
any subjective belief a given officer might have that a particular individual is a drug 
suspect (Whren).  This leads to the likelihood that police officers will use race as the 
basis for suspecting an individual is a drug criminal after initiating contact through the 
pretext of a minor traffic stop.  As if this were not bad enough, once a law enforcement 
official has initiated contact with a “suspect” it is perfectly legal for that officer to use 
deceitful tactics to facilitate “consent” from the driver to search the vehicle in the hopes 
of uncovering a drug violation.  The Operation Pipeline training received by state and 
local law enforcement therefore ensures that police officers throughout the nation could 
take full advantage of their legal right to overly target minority offenders.   
One study of traffic stop data of the Los Angeles Police Department from July 
2004 until June 2005 supports the assertion that law enforcement officers practice racial 
profiling.  This study found that Hispanic and black drivers were four times as likely as 
white motorists to be searched by the LAPD.  In fact, this study also showed that even 
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though African-American drivers are subjected to searches more often than their white 
counterparts, the discovery rate of criminal activity from these searches was higher for 
white drivers (Armentrout, Goodrich, Nguyen, Ortega, Smith & Khadjavi, 2007, p. 33).  
These data support the assertion that police overly target minority drivers for searches 
following traffic stops.   
The Court decisions legalizing pretextual traffic stops and consent searches under 
the guise of waging war on drugs appear to be a façade given these data as well as the 
earlier evidence presented showing drug usage varying little across races.  Just as 
segregation established an institution of legal subjugation of African-Americans, this 
nation’s war on drug policy has turned the criminal justice system into the contemporary 
institutional equivalent to minority advancement out of the exploited lower class to which 
they have historically occupied.  Of course it is no longer socially acceptable to explicitly 
deny a person Constitutional protections based solely on race as it was during the period 
of time of segregation.  The modern-day system of mass incarceration that perpetuates 
minority subjugation instead relies on war on drugs policy to increase the criminality of 
drug violations and to frame this nation’s drug problem almost exclusively as the scourge 
of inner-city minority communities.  
One example of this framing can be found by examining the “crack babies” myth 
that was popularized in the 1980s.  A study of just 23 infants spawned the “crack baby” 
madness and led researchers to exaggerate the impact of prenatal cocaine use on newborn 
infants (Winerip, 2013).  Appalling symptoms such as tremors and low birth weight were 
reported by researches and many major media outlets ran stories that went beyond the 
over-hyped research.  In fact, fetal alcoholism is a much more serious problem than 
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prenatal cocaine use but this did not receive the same coverage as the “crack baby” story 
(Winerip, 2013).  This framing of the crack baby story by the media as an epidemic 
reinforced a stereotype of the typical drug offender as a poor minority who is extremely 
deviant from mainstream society and not deserving of longstanding Constitutional 
protections found in the 4
th
 Amendment.   
 Sadly, our country’s transition to a system of mass imprisonment as the primary 
institution of enforcing minority subjugation has required more than just the erosion of 
individual rights against unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement.  When 
researching the potential penalties for convicted drug offenders, as well as the rights one 
typically must relinquish upon receiving a felony drug conviction, it becomes clear that 
this nation’s war on drugs is designed to subjugate the minority individuals targeted for 
enforcement of the drug laws and not to eliminate drug use itself.  The policies 
formulated to fight the war on drugs are designed to stack the deck against those who are 
unfortunate enough to receive a felony drug conviction.  Once someone, especially a 
minority, has fallen victim to the enforcement practices described above, the system then 
imposes penalties and conditions so severe that advancement out of the poor 
circumstances that often contribute to the drug crime in the first place becomes nearly 
impossible.   
As noted above, criminal penalties were expanded when the war on drugs began 
in the 1980s.  However, these penalties apparently were not quite harsh enough so in the 
1990s welfare and social reforms were passed establishing civil collateral consequences 
following a felony drug conviction, designed to punish offenders after leaving 
imprisonment.  A few examples of these kinds of civil penalties are The Felony Drug 
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Provision of the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, The United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development “one strike and you’re out” initiative of 1996, and the 1998 
amendment of the Higher Education Act.   
The 1996 legislation regarding welfare reform included a section known as The 
Felony Drug Provision which instituted a lifetime ban on Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF) as well as banning food stamp benefits for individuals with felony drug 
convictions.  The “one strike and you’re out” initiative adopted by the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1996 gave public housing agencies 
and Section 8 landlords (federally subsidized low-income housing) the authority to evict 
a tenant or any person under the control of the tenant for involvement in drug-related 
criminal activity on or off the public housing premises.  Then in 1998 the Higher 
Education Act was amended to cut off any student with a federal or state conviction 
involving possession or sale of a controlled dangerous substance from receiving any 
grant, loan, or work assistance to attend college (Reynolds, 2004).  Clearly, the institution 
of each of these collateral consequences functioned to weaken convicted drug offenders 
post imprisonment re-integration into society.  And, since most of these released 
offenders were minorities, the policies had an even greater effect on these populations.  In 
fact, these policies worked to extend the warlike attitude against the minority drug 
offender into the area of social policy, classifying them as undeserving of just about any 
kind of assistance from mainstream society.   
 The legislation imposing collateral consequences for felony drug convictions, 
punishing offenders even after they are released from imprisonment, lends even more 
support to the argument that the system of mass incarceration was primarily designed to 
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perpetuate subjugation of minority communities under the pretense of a war on drugs.  In 
spite of this country’s astonishing increase in imprisonment over the last three decades, it 
still cannot be a permanent method of subjugating minority drug offenders as nearly all 
prisoners (93%) are released and return to their communities (Reynolds, 2004, p. 252).   
The collateral consequences of imprisonment, particularly imprisonment from a 
felony drug conviction, which results in civil consequences greater than those faced by a 
convicted rapist, punish more than just the former offender.  They punish the children, 
families, and communities of minority drug offenders (Reynolds, 2004).  These social 
consequences resulting from a war on drugs allow the system of mass incarceration to 
extend further into the minority communities from which an extremely disproportionate 
number of drug offenders come.  These policies allow politicians the opportunity to 
disinvest in and thoroughly disconnect poor, minority communities from mainstream 
society.  This has all been done under rhetoric supporting the elimination of dangerous 
drugs while at the same time creating and enforcing drug control policies that make it 
even harder for a nonviolent drug offender to reintegrate back into society.  Just like the 
institution of slavery and the legally-supported practice of segregation were both 
designed to ensure that minorities would be perpetually subjected to an inequality of 
opportunity, today’s system of mass incarceration enforces this societal cleavage today 
through a supposedly race-neutral war on drugs ideology.   
 Up to this point this essay’s primary discussion regards the evidence supporting 
the argument that this nation’s decades-long expansion of the penal system through war 
on drugs policy, as well as the social consequences of a drug conviction, have functioned 
to continue the historical practice of minority subjugation in our society.  For those 
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readers who have yet to be convinced of these arguments we now turn to the moralistic 
justifications policymakers have commonly espoused to legitimize the war on drugs, 
claiming it is an honest enforcement effort aimed at lowering drug use.  This discussion 
should make it even clearer that war on drugs policy and Court decisions regarding such 
policy has transformed this country’s criminal justice system into an institution 
responsible for perpetuating the historical exploitation of the minority underclass.   
 One of the primary justifications given by many politicians and citizens for the 
necessity of harsh criminal penalties for drug violations, is that we must severely punish 
those who are caught so that potential offenders will be deterred from engaging in the 
same activity.  This is the primary belief of many tough on crime politicians who believe 
that the criminal justice system should be guided by deterrence theory in enforcing 
criminal violations.  For example, when asked about his get-tough crime policies, then 
Mayor of New York City Rudolph Giuliani stated “Obviously murder and graffiti are two 
vastly different crimes.  But they are part of the same continuum, and a climate that 
tolerates one is more likely to tolerate the other (Francis).”  
Giuliani’s stance is motivated by a belief in the effectiveness in general 
deterrence.  General deterrence assumes that people will observe the severe punishments 
that others receive for violating the law and determine that these punishments are too 
severe to risk any potential benefit from committing the crime.  Deterrence can also be 
classified as specific or individual.  The concept of specific deterrence relates to 
individuals as opposed to the general public.  Those who prescribe to the validity of 
specific deterrence in criminal punishment believe that the punishment a convicted 
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offender receives should be so severe that the offender is discouraged from committing 
the crime ever again (Clear, Cole, & Reisig, 2011).   
Measuring the effectiveness of criminal punishment in deterring potential 
offenders is tricky for a great number of reasons.  One reason is that it is dependent on 
potential criminals thinking rationally, which may be a very unrealistic assumption for 
criminals generally but perhaps even more so when one is under the influence of drugs.  
Another problem with deterrence is that it is impossible to measure the number of 
individuals that were deterred from committing a crime because of fear of getting 
punished.  For example, many studies have been conducted on the effectiveness of the 
death penalty in deterring murder with contesting results.  University of Buffalo professor 
Isaac Ehrlich published the first study on this in 1975 finding that an execution saved an 
average of eight lives.  These findings provided scientific justification for the death 
penalty, but Ehrlich’s conclusions were rejected by an expert panel of the National 
Academy of Sciences three years later in 1978 and later studies on this same topic have 
followed a similar pattern.  This debate has produced a standoff with some more recent 
studies claiming a deterrent effect greater than that observed by Ehrlich while recent 
studies of only capital-eligible homicides indicate no deterrent effect from executions 
(Fagan, 2013).  Given the shortcomings of scientific studies seeking validation on the 
general deterrent effect of severe punishment, it should come as no surprise that harsher 
penalties have had little success in lowering crime, including drug crimes (Clear, Cole & 
Reisig, 2011).  The effectiveness of specific deterrence has also been called into question 
by researchers recently.  Criminologists Cassia Spohn and David Holleran concluded in 
22 
 
their study on felony drug offenders that those sentenced to incarceration have higher 
recidivism rates than those sentenced to probation (Spohn & Holleran, 2002). 
 Even those who may still hold convictions that deterrence is effective in criminal 
punishment despite the scientific shortcomings previously noted, cannot ignore the 
studies that have found imprisonment to now be a regular predictable part of the life 
experience for young black and Hispanic males in large urban centers.  Black men are 
now faced with a lifetime risk of imprisonment of almost 30 percent since the expansion 
of the prison system while white men have a risk lower than 5 percent (Petit & Western, 
2004 p. 156).  The increased imposition of incarceration as punishment for minority drug 
offenders has been taken to such an extreme level that serving a term in prison has 
become a more common life event for recent birth cohorts of black men than college 
graduation or military service (Petit & Western, 2004 p. 164).  When such a state of 
affairs exists, when children in a community are more likely to associate with someone 
with a prison record than a military record or college degree, it is logical to assume that 
such youth will find it easier to accept imprisonment as a normal occurrence of everyday 
life, rather than an effective deterrent against crime.  And in fact, many observers believe 
that the war on crime has led to a diminishing of the stigmatizing effect of arrest and 
imprisonment among poor black males as it becoming a more common experience 
(Walker, 2006 p. 111).  Therefore, as the country’s prison population has increased 
through war on drugs policies it has achieved a level of racial disproportion in 
imprisonment so high that not only is the threat of incarceration ineffective as a deterrent, 
it is now accepted as a common occurrence in many minority communities.  
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 The argument above has established that the penalties associated with the war on 
drugs do not adequately deter drug use, sale, or manufacture in our society.  Next, the 
amount of damage drugs cause in minority communities compared with the damage 
caused by drug enforcement will be the final basis for the dismissal of any legitimate 
explanation for this “war.”  Some have argued that increasing criminal penalties, and 
unequally enforcing these penalties in minority communities, is justified because drugs 
are the main source of the crimes that are destroying these communities.  However, this 
last potentially legitimate justification for the war on drugs is also not supported by the 
research:  there does not appear to be a simple connection between the use of drugs and 
violent or other criminal behavior.  In fact, The National Association for Public Health 
Policy recognized in 1998 that an objective evaluation of the war on drug enforcement in 
this country demonstrates that the enforcement of the war has caused more damage in the 
communities than the drugs themselves (National Association for Public Health Policy, 
1999 p. 268).   
Specifically, the enforcement of war on drugs policy has led to an increase in 
violence in minority communities by creating a hugely profitable and illegal business 
environment that is largely responsible for high urban murder rates as drug dealers kill 
each other for market and turf (National Association for Public Health Policy, 1999 p. 
274).  The Bureau of Justice Statistics examined homicides in the 75 most populous 
counties in the United States in 1988 and found that many homicides involved drug 
trafficking.  As many as 18% of defendants of homicides were involved in circumstances 
such as drug manufacture, arguments over drugs, and bad drug deals when their crimes 
were committed (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1994).  
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Other research has indicated that increasing drug enforcement can cause property 
crime.  Studies indicate that reallocating limited police resources from control of property 
crimes to control of drug crimes significantly lowers the risk faced by property criminals.  
This in turn leads to a significant increase in the amount of property crime (Benson, 
Rasmussen, & Sollars, 1995).  For example, a 2000 time-series analysis of crime in New 
York City completed by Corman and Mocan concluded that the positive impact of drug 
arrests on crime was stronger than the positive relationship of heavy drug use on robbery 
and burglary.  Benson, Leburn, and Rasmussen also found from their study of Florida 
data from 1994-97 that the opportunity cost of more drug enforcement is more Index I 
crime (Benson, Leburn & Rasmussen, 2001 p. 1001-1002).   
These studies provide clear evidence that there is more harm done by the 
enforcement of drug violations than the harm these substances cause through use and 
addiction.  Given this evidence showing that the war on drug policies have destroyed 
minority communities, the continued existence of the system of enforcement of these 
laws and the mass incarceration of offenders suggests it is not connected with fighting 
crime at all.  It seems clear that this policy is about enforcing strict controls on over-
policed African-American communities, thus preventing them from attaining the equality 
of rights and the opportunities available to other Americans, rights and opportunities also 
denied them under slavery and during pre-Civil Rights institutional segregation.  
 Criminologists have long studied why laws are made that criminalize certain 
behavior but not others.  For example in 1964 Chambliss described the emergence of 
vagrancy laws as a reaction to changes in the economic social structure in England during 
the time of the Black Death plague (Chambliss, 1964 p. 69).  This classic work sparked a 
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new way of thinking among sociologists about the process of criminalization and helped 
spawn hundreds of historical case studies that helped to develop an analytic argument on 
the process that is commonly espoused today.  Basically, this argument attributes 
criminalization to changes in structural conditions in society.  People in society with the 
power to change and institutionalize criminal law are motivated to criminalize a set of 
activities attributed to a social group as a way of instituting control on the group (Jenness, 
2004 p. 150).   
As an example, public opinion survey data from 1985, when the war on drugs was 
just beginning, show only two percent of respondents said drug abuse was the nation’s 
most important problem.  Such evidence has helped lead some scholars to conclude that 
the escalation of the war on drugs by law enforcement throughout the country after 1984 
was a product of institutional policy changes that encouraged police departments to drum 
up public support for this crackdown (Benson, Rasmussen, & Sollars, 1995 p. 22).  This 
suggests that the analytic argument of criminalization first proposed by Chambliss in 
1964 may be applied to the current war on drugs.  Civil Rights legislation ended the legal 
subjugation of black Americans who could no longer be denied equal rights and 
opportunities because of their race.  The Civil Rights movement can be viewed as the 
structural change in society that led policy makers to initiate the war on drugs at a time 
when most of the public did not appear overly concerned with drug abuse.  The 
disproportionate impact that war on drugs policy has had on African American 
communities since its inception provides further support for the argument that these 
policies have been used to overly target minorities for social control by the system of 
mass imprisonment.   
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President Nixon verbally declared a war against drugs about a decade before 
President Reagan, and although Nixon’s war did not focus on enforcement, his 
administration provided the first glimpse at how politicians could gain the support of 
working class and poor white voters.  H.R. Haldeman, a key adviser of President Nixon, 
at one point stated the former leader purposely advanced a racial strategy, saying “He 
(Nixon) emphasized that you have to face the fact that the whole problem is really the 
blacks.  The key is to devise a system that recognizes this while not appearing to 
(Alexander, 2010 p. 43-44).”   
That system became mass incarceration through the war on drugs initiated by 
Nixon but expanded by the Reagan Administration.  Politicians gained public support for 
a policy that basically ensured minority communities would be subjected to extremely 
disadvantageous circumstances.  These policies, moreover, almost guaranteed that many, 
if not most, poor African Americans could not advance out of their exploited 
circumstances and compete with lower-class whites for the limited resources afforded 
them by our capitalist system.     
 Theoretical work regarding the Conflict perspective of the criminal justice system 
lends even more support for the argument that the war on drugs has overly targeted 
minority communities for control through mass imprisonment.  This perspective has been 
traced to the political writings of the philosophers Hobbes and Machiavelli who 
recognized that power and self-interest played an integral role in shaping human 
interactions.   
There are a number of different varieties of Conflict theory including radical 
feminism, left realism, and peacemaking criminology (Greek, 2005).  However, the 
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implementation of war on drugs policy outlined by this essay is best understood through 
the lens of class struggle traced to Marxist theory (see, for example, Trainer, 2010).  
Marxist theory is centered on the belief that class struggle for the means of production in 
society permeates all areas of society.  Under the Conflict theory of the criminal justice 
system, the design of our society’s criminal justice system is merely a reflection of 
policies that the upper class have designed to protect their interests or social status.  One 
of the main assumptions that Conflict theorists use as a basis for their beliefs on the 
nature of the criminal justice system is that the state is the mediator of class struggle in 
society (Lenin, 1932).  In fact, there is no such thing as a neutral state under the 
framework of the Conflict perspective of the criminal justice system.  One element of the 
state that Marxists routinely point to as proof that the state is used to enforce the 
dominance of the ruling upper class is the police institution, an institution that gives the 
state sole legitimate authority on the legal use of violence and coercion in society (Crank, 
2003).   
 Looking at this nation’s current war on drugs policy under the framework of the 
Conflict perspective provides a prime example of the Marxist view of class struggle 
permeating the social structure.  Prior to the creation of the system of mass incarceration 
through war on drugs policy, the state mediated class struggle through institutions that 
were blatantly racist, such as slavery and segregation.  By legally establishing minorities 
as undeserving, these institutions insured that minority communities would not be given 
equal rights or the same opportunities for advancement that white members of society 
enjoyed.  Since slavery was abolished by the 13
th
 Amendment (U.S. Const. amend. XIII), 
and as the fight for civil rights started to achieve victories in ending the discriminatory 
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practices of segregation, it became necessary for the state to develop an institution that 
could be portrayed as race-neutral while still functioning to enforce the lower-class status 
of minority communities.  This was precisely the problem that was recognized by former 
President Nixon when he discussed with his former adviser Haldeman that the problem 
was “the blacks” and creating a system that realized this without appearing overtly racist, 
as this was no longer acceptable in society.   
Unsurprisingly to the Marxist, policymakers used the power of the state, in 
particular the police, courts, and corrections, to legitimize the new institution of designed 
social control known as mass incarceration.  Moreover, the monopoly on violence that 
the law enforcement institution enjoys in our society was further exploited by greatly 
increasing the threat of violence to drug offenders through a militarization of the police.  
For example, in 1997 alone the Cato Institute observed that the Pentagon gave over 1.2 
million pieces of military equipment to local police departments to help them wage the 
war on drugs (Balko, 2006 p. 8) .  The emergence of the use of SWAT teams was another 
effort by the state to induce cooperation with increased drug enforcement by upping the 
ante on the use of violence in local policing.  This process was so thorough that today the 
main use of SWAT teams is to serve narcotics warrants (Alexander, 2010 p. 73).   
The war on drugs, initially designed by President Reagan and furthered by other 
policymakers since, was not just about strong political rhetoric but it actually provided 
the blueprint for how the powerful in society would legitimize the system of mass 
incarceration.  The authority for local law enforcement to use violence has been steadily 
increased under the guise of the drug war, and the violence makes it evident to the 
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minority offenders, who are disproportionately targeted, are the enemy who will be 
controlled by any means necessary.   
 The arguments presented in this essay thus far should establish that the war on 
drugs has been very effective in growing this country’s prison system into an institution 
of social control for poor minority communities.  From the year 1970 to 2005, there was a 
700 percent increase in the prison population of the United States (Clear, Cole, & Reisig, 
2011).  There are about 2.3 million people currently incarcerated in this country and 
nearly 1 million of these individuals are black (National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, 2013).  According to the most recent U.S. Census 
estimates from 2011, blacks constitute only 13.1% of the total population (United States 
Census Bureau, 2013) which shows they are significantly overrepresented amongst the 
incarcerated population.  In fact, minorities are so disproportionately incarcerated that the 
prison and jail population would decrease by nearly half if blacks and Hispanics were 
imprisoned at the same rate as whites (Austin, Clear, Duster, Greenberg, Irwin, 
McCoy…& Page, 2007).   
Not only has this growth in incarceration disproportionately affected poor, 
minority members of society but the prison expansion in this country has been funded at 
the expense of other areas of public spending.  For example, the state of Colorado saw 
state revenues decline 7.8 percent between fiscal year 2007-08 and fiscal year 2011-12 
which led to a number of significant cuts to most areas of state spending.  Both higher 
education and K-12 education were among the areas that saw their general fund 
appropriations slashed as the overall appropriations of the general fund decreased 5.1% 
over this time.  The Public Safety and Courts sector of state spending was one of only 
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two sectors to receive an increase over this same period.  This sector, which includes the 
Department of Corrections, Department of Law, and the Department of Public Safety, 
received a 6.0% increase in general fund allocation.  This increased the Public Safety and 
Courts budget appropriation to 15.2% of general fund spending, or roughly $1.06 billion 
in fiscal year 2011-12.  In comparison, the spending for this budget item in fiscal year 
1988 totaled approximately $76 million (Griesmer, 2012 p. 3-4).  This evidence provides 
support for the argument that the war on drugs has disproportionately affected people 
from poor communities.  Colorado passed a budget that cut state spending for education 
while at the same time approving public funds for corrections over 1,000% greater than 
the amount spent by this same sector less than 25 years earlier.  Public school districts in 
Colorado are primarily financed from state tax revenue ($3.4 billion, fiscal year 2012-13) 
but also receive a significant amount of funding from local property taxes ($1.8 billion, 
fiscal year 2012-13 (The Colorado Department of Education, 2013).  It logically follows 
then that reducing the amount of money the state gives to fund local school districts will 
have a greater impact on the poorest school districts that are not able to generate the same 
level of property tax revenue as more affluent districts. 
  In spite of the obvious success the war on drugs has had in fueling a 
contemporary system of minority control and subjugation in society, this has come at a 
cost much greater than the $104 that is now spent yearly by every United States resident 
to run state prisons (Clear, Cole, & Reisig, 2011).  The extremely disproportionate impact 
that war on drugs policy has had on poor minority communities will logically lead to 
these communities developing a sense of mistrust for the system.  Polls conducted in 
2012 by the Pew Research Center are consistent with findings from earlier surveys in 
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2007 and 1995 that support the position that confidence in local law enforcement in this 
country is greatly impacted by race.  Specifically, over one-third of blacks polled 
reported that they had very little confidence that their local police agency will give equal 
treatment to all races.  Only nine percent of whites expressed this same level of mistrust 
in local law enforcement.   
However, these are not the only responses that appear to indicate a racial cleavage 
in the perception of equal treatment in society.  Almost half of blacks polled (43%) 
responded that there is a lot of discrimination against their race while less than one-
seventh of whites (13%) supported this perception.  Perhaps the most shocking indication 
of racial division in society may be that the vast majority of African-Americans in this 
survey (81%) believe that this country must keep making changes to provide blacks with 
rights equal to white members of society.  A majority of whites surveyed (54%), 
however, expressed the opinion that the country had made the changes necessary to 
provide blacks with rights equal to white individuals in society (Pew Research Center for 
the People & the Press, 2012).   
The survey data cited above support the assumption that members of black 
communities commonly believe their local police agency would provide unequal 
treatment to members of their race.  The fact that this perception of mistrust in law 
enforcement specifically, and society in general, is so much more prevalent among black 
respondents than white respondents lends further support for the argument that the war on 
drugs provided the fuel necessary to transform this country’s prison system into a 
contemporary institution for enforcing minority control and ultimately, subjugation.  
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 The statistics on the black incarceration rate of this country, as well as the 
evaluation of the Colorado state budget noted above, support the argument that the 
detriments of this country’s mass incarceration system have disproportionately impacted 
people from poor minority communities, subjecting these groups to control and 
subjugation.  New federal data on drug arrests in 2010 and 2011 support the claim that 
black drug offenders are unfairly targeted by law enforcement.  Arrests for marijuana 
possession account for nearly half of all drug arrests in this country.  The evidence 
indicates that marijuana, like other drugs, is used at a comparable rate amongst black and 
white individuals yet blacks are nearly four times as likely to be arrested for marijuana 
possession (Hart, 2013).   
This apparent targeting of black drug offenders may help explain the emergence 
of an antiestablishment movement in black communities designed to foster an 
environment of noncooperation.  For example, the “No Snitch” idea traces its roots back 
to rap lyrics in the late 1990s and has since grown into a cultural movement prevalent in 
many major American cities including Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Dallas (Masten, 2009 
p. 702).  This movement has expanded its influence into cities through rap lyrics from 
songs like “Snitch” by rap artist Obie Trice in which the last lines of the chorus state 
“Just don’t, whatever you do snitch, cause you will get hit, pray I don’t face you, yeah 
(Trice, 2006).”  These kinds of rap lyrics are used along with clothing depicting various 
“No Snitch” slogans to encourage individual members of communities to refuse 
cooperating with local law enforcement.   
The atmosphere of noncompliance promoted by this movement is so thorough 
that people will refuse to provide police with information regarding violent crimes to 
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which they are a witness and even in some instances of violent crimes in which they are a 
victim (Masten, 2009).  The evisceration of the 4
th
 Amendment discussed earlier has 
provided fuel for this movement as the Supreme Court has routinely ruled in favor of law 
enforcement officials in cases regarding the extent of Constitutional protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures by the police.  Examples of such decisions include the 
Bostick and Whren cases mentioned earlier.   
The success of law enforcement agencies can be greatly impacted by community 
cooperation. However, community action such as the “No Snitch” movement popularizes 
the delegitimizing of local law enforcement agencies throughout major American cities, 
thus making it increasingly difficult for officers to enforce not only drug violations but 
also all other types of crime.  The nature of many drug law violations make them difficult 
for the police to detect and enforce since nearly all participants are willing parties who do 
not consider themselves victims and generally attempt to hide their drug use.  It should 
then come as no surprise that many potential drug violators are unwilling to cooperate 
with police.  However, the war on drugs created an environment where policymakers, as 
well as the judiciary, through actions such as the “No Snitch” movement, are willing to 
expand law enforcement authority in the name of justice to such a degree that an 
increasing number of people in urban communities would rather see a violent criminal go 
free then provide police with any level of cooperation.   
 This paper has argued that the war on drugs policy, first enacted under the Reagan 
administration, has been calculated and targeted to foster a system of mass incarceration 
disproportionately affecting individuals from poor, minority communities.  The system of 
mass imprisonment that emerged from increasing the criminality of drug violations and 
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differentially enforcing these violations in urban centers dominated by poor minorities 
has been shown to be a modern analogue to the institutions of slavery and legally 
enforced segregation that existed in this country during earlier time.  In spite of statistics 
showing that drugs are used with roughly equal prevalence among the races, the war on 
drugs has had an extremely disproportionate impact on minority drug offenders.   
A historical pattern can be observed in our society of the use of controlled 
substance policy to place more institutional control on a particular race or ethnicity 
associated with the use of a given substance.  The war on drugs allowed policymakers to 
frame the drug problem as primarily a problem of poor minority communities that are 
ravaged by violent, drug-crazed criminals selling drugs for huge profits.  Yet the 
increased criminality of drug violations, popularized by war on drug policy, has been the 
catalyst for increasing property and violent crime; for example urban burglary and theft 
rates as well as urban homicide rates, have been influenced by drug dealer violence.  
Moreover, increasing the criminality of drug violations while differentially enforcing 
these violations in poor minority communities has allowed the state to disinvest in social 
programs that would provide equal opportunities for advancement to African-Americans.  
By creating the environment necessary for drug crime to flourish by increasing criminal 
penalties for these violations while at the same time increasing enforcement of these 
laws, the state was able to institutionalize a race-neutral justification for the unequal 
protection of black rights in today’s society.   
In short, the war on drugs was never designed to eliminate the damage that drug 
use inflicts on society by reducing use or supply as policymakers would like us to 
believe.  The war on drugs was instead a calculated effort to ensure that the state could 
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continue to provide legal, institutionalized impediments to advancement out of the 
exploited lower-class historically occupied by black Americans through slavery and legal 
segregation.  The war on drugs has never been about providing an avenue to bring justice 
against the drug offenders supposedly wreaking violent havoc on our society.  The 
violence associated with the war on drugs has largely been a result of the damage 
inflicted by law enforcement officials designated with the service of justice.  The 
evidence and arguments presented throughout this essay show that the war on drugs is 
nothing less than a present-day adaptation of institutionalizing unjust subjugation of 
African-American communities.  
It is now time to try and address the injustice of the system of mass incarceration 
and examine what might be done to bring an end to the institution of minority 
subjugation.  If we hope to make progress towards ending the system, it is important to 
have an understanding of the impediments to change we are likely to encounter.  In her 
book on mass imprisonment called The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness, Michelle Alexander discusses how the tremendous size of today’s prison 
system in itself creates a gigantic barrier to enacting change.  Alexander notes that in 
order to return to the incarceration levels of the 1970s, 80% of prisoners would have to be 
released which in turn could lead to more than a million justice system employees losing 
their jobs (Alexander, 2010 p. 218).  The millions of people employed by the justice 
system are likely to resist attempts to eradicate the mass imprisonment system of social 
control as they have a vested financial interest in maintaining the status quo.  Sadly, 
justice system employees are not the only members of society that profit from the system 
of mass incarceration.  Private corporations such as the American Correctional 
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Association contract with states to build and operate prisons in order to make a profit.  
This provides powerful incentive to resist any changes that would lower the number of 
people subjected to correctional control (Alexander, 2010 p. 219). 
This essay has primarily focused on those subjected to the social control of the 
mass imprisonment system fueled by the war on drugs.  However, those within the 
system responsible for enforcing this institutional social control have also been impacted 
by this great prison expansion.  This paper has provided a number of statistics to support 
the claim that expenditures on law enforcement and corrections have increased greatly in 
this country since the war on drugs sparked the institution of mass imprisonment.  
However, this spending data is not useful until the masses realize that each and every 
dollar allocated to the system of mass incarceration is used by the state to ensure that 
some members of society will profit from the unjust removal of human freedom.  
Dramatic increases in enforcement and incarceration expenditures, such as the 1,000% 
growth in Colorado state appropriations from fiscal year 1988 to fiscal year 2012, may 
then be viewed as an act of the state to buy more support for the system of mass 
imprisonment. 
Earlier this paper used the Conflict theory of class struggle to establish a 
theoretical support for the argument that the war on drugs has disproportionately targeted 
poor, minority offenders for subjugation.  This theoretical perspective further argues that 
the system of mass imprisonment cannot be brought down by making incremental 
changes through a handful of legal reforms.  The first step of course is to end the war on 
drugs and implement a national drug policy that treats drug addiction as an issue of 
public health.  This may be done by adopting harm-reduction policy strategies similar to 
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the ones proposed by the National Association for Public Health Policy in their 1999 
report entitled A Public Health Approach to Mitigating the Negative Consequences of 
Illicit Drug Abuse (National Association for Public Health Policy, 1999).   
But perhaps more importantly, the Conflict theory of class struggle hinges on the 
belief that the state is the mediator of class struggle for the means of production in 
society.  The state established a system of mass incarceration using the war on drugs to 
disproportionately target and subjugate poor, minority offenders to protect the interests of 
the elite.  Over $185 billion was spent by the US on police protection, detention, judicial, 
and legal activities in the year 2003 alone (Alexander, 2010 p. 218).  The Conflict theory 
of class struggle hinges on the belief that the state mediates this struggle to protect the 
interests of the upper class and block the lower class from attaining the means of 
production.  Therefore, the poor, disproportionately minority communities that have been 
overly targeted and subjugated by the mass imprisonment system must organize a 
collective movement that demands the state end the social control of incarceration that 
primarily protects the interests of the upper class. 
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